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ARGUMENT
The arguments by appellees Fleetwood Services, Inc. ("Fleetwood") or
Wilshire Insurance Company ("Wilshire") do not justify affirmance of the
contested trial court's rulings, as explained below.

Fleetwood's Arguments

1.

Appeal is moot and court is without jurisdiction.

Fleetwood first

argues that because the underlying consent judgment supposedly expired on March
27, 2017, the appeal is moot and should be dismissed.

Here, Fleetwood is

mistaken for numerous reasons. First, Fleetwood's argument focuses solely on the
judgment that was entered, and ignores Espenschied's separate settlement
~

agreement. Espenschied remains bound by a settlement agreement in which it is
obligated, among other things, to pay $1.1 million (plus interest).

~

Indeed, the

judgment is not even mentioned in the settlement agreement, let alone dispositive
ofEspenschied's obligations. (See Addendum Exh. 3 hereto, R. 1771-1781.)
In any event, Fleetwood incorrectly assumes that the eight year limitation in
either bringing an action on a judgment or in renewing the judgment is
determinative of the issues.

Plaintiff/appellant Espenschied Transport Corp.

expressly agreed to toll the limitations and to waive the application of any
limitation. It has likewise acknowledged the full validity of the judgment. See
Addendum Exh. 1,

,r,r 6-7, and Exh A attached thereto, ,r,r 5-7.

Accordingly, the

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court in the consent judgment proceedings renewed the judgment on August 15,
2017. See Addendum Exh. 2.
This Court held that a renewed judgment "gives new life to a party's original
judgment". Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 2015 UT 11, ,I 30, 347 P.3d 385.
Thus, the original consent judgment based on the settlement between the Herrods
and Espenschied has remained void throughout the entire course of this litigation.
Setting aside the fact that there has been a renewal of the judgment,
Fleetwood's arguments are misguided. The relevant statutes read as follows:
An action may be brought within eight years upon a judgment or decree of
any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United
States.

Utah Code Anno. § 78B-2-31 l.
Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed
in accordance with law.
Utah Code Anno. § 78B-5-202 (1).
A court of record may renew a judgment issued by a court if:
a motion is filed within the original action;
(1)
(2)

the motion is filed before the statute of limitations on the original
judgment expires;

(3)

the motion includes an affidavit that contains an accounting of the
original judgment and all post judgment payments, credits, and
other adjustments which are provided for by law or are contained
within the original judgment;

(4)

the facts in the supporting affidavit are determined by the court to
be accurate and the affidavit affirms that notice was sent to the
most current address known for the judgment debtor;
2
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(5)

the time for responding to the motion has expired; and

(6)

the fee required by Utah Code Anno. Subsection 78A-2-301(1)(1)
has been paid to the clerk of the court.

Utah Code Anno., § 78B-2-3 l 1.
Each of the above statutes has been met. Utah Code Anno. § 78B-2-311
requires that any action upon a judgment may be brought within eight years. The
~

present action, which is an action to recover money to satisfy the judgment, was
commenced on September 14, 2007. R. 1-11.
Utah Code Anno. § 78B-2-311 provides that a judgment shall continue for
eight years unless "enforcement of the judgment is stayed". Here, at the request of
Espenschied and Fleetwood, the trial court stayed the present case on
September 30, 2011, "this action shall be stayed until further order of the Court."
R. 1273-1276.

The trial court never issued an order lifting the stay, but on

April 11, 2012, the court issued an Order to Show Cause and Scheduling
Conference. R. 1279-1280. At the hearing on May 23, 2012, the parties reported
i..JJ

the status and advised the court of the stay. R. 1281.
On March 12, 2013, the court issued another order to show cause. R. 1285.
Thereafter, Wilshire moved the trial court to continue the stay, to which Fleetwood
joined. R.1308-1315; 1322-1323. Espenschied opposed the motions to continue
the stay arguing that the Herrod judgment against Espenschied is independent of
any federal action. R. 1327-1330. "Espenschied has already waited almost six

3
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years to have its claims resolved. There is no justification for further delay and
Espenschied is entitled to have its claims resolved." Id. 1330. The court did not
issue an order to lift the stay.
In another pretrial hearing on November 18, 2014, the parties reported to the
court that the federal action was completed and the present action could proceed.
R. 13 69. Thus, this case was stayed for over three years, which would exceed any
claimed expiration of the judgment.
As it relates to Utah Code Anno. § 78B-2-311, the judgment has been
renewed. The only relevant condition for its renewal is that a motion be filed
"before the statute of limitations on the original judgment expires". The limitation
period had not expired because: ( 1) Espenschied had agreed to toll and waive the
running of the limitation; and (2) the present case had been stayed for over three
years, which would extend the limitation period accordingly.
Utah has long accepted the consensual tolling of statutes of limitations. For
example, a judgment debtor may agree to toll the limitation, or waive the
application of a limitation. LeFevre v. Stout (In re Estate of LeFevre), 2009 UT
App 286, ,I 31,220 P.3d 476 (statute of limitations is a waivable defense); Keller v.
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1998) (same); James v.

Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 573-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This Court has jurisdiction
and the matter is not moot.

4
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~

Here, Fleetwood and Wilshire have wrongfully denied Espenschied 's claims.
vi

From the outset, this litigation has been to hold Fleetwood and Wilshire
responsible for failing to provide the statutorily mandated trucker's insurance. The
Herrods are part of the public for which such insurance is designed to protect. This
litigation has been ongoing for nearly ten years. These claims against Fleetwood
and Wilshire are the only means whereby the Herrods may recover for their
personal injuries.
2.

Unpaid judgments are not damages.

Fleetwood argues that certain

cases from other jurisdictions support its position that an unpaid judgment cannot
be used to establish damages in claims against agents and brokers. Fleetwood
vtJ

relies on Valentine v. Membrila Ins. Services, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th 462, 476, 13
Cal. Rptr. 3d 125, 136 (2004) ("Valentine"), and argues that its facts are similar to

v-'

DC-10 Entertainment, LLC v. Manor Insurance Agency, Inc, 308 P.3d 1223 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2013), upon which Espenschied relies. Fleetwood then points out that the

Valentine case arrives at an opposite result.
Fleetwood's argument is misplaced. Valentine offered four reasons why it
believed that a judgment coupled with a covenant not to execute does not give rise
to recovery against a broker. First, where the facts needed to determine whether an
insurer has a duty to defend are easy to assemble, there is uncertainty about when a
broker's duty to defend arises. Id. at 473. Second, insurers acting in bad faith are

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

more blameworthy than brokers who negligently fail to procure insurance, and it is
this blameworthiness that justifies a procedure that, in the opinion of the court,
invites collusion and fraud. Id. at 474. Third, unlike an insurer, whose bargaining
strength dwarfs that of an insured, a broker may have less knowledge and
sophistication concerning a specialized area of commercial insurance than its
client. Id. Fourth, a stipulated judgment, standing alone, is not a fair barometer of
the damages caused by a broker's negligence. Id. at 476. These reasons are
unpersuasive or otherwise inapposite to the facts at hand.

Valentines discussion about a broker not knowing when its duty to defend
has arisen is inapposite to the facts at hand.

Unlike the case in Valentine,

Espenschied's attorney specifically requested that Fleetwood defend it.

Valentines discussion of the blameworthiness of an insurer versus a broker
is also not applicable here. An insurer's decision to deny coverage is not always the
result of bad faith. An insurer can err in denying coverage, without acting in bad
faith, if the denial of coverage is fairly debatable. Such a denial would be no more
blameworthy than negligently failing to procure insurance, especially where, as is
the case with Espenschied and Fleetwood, there is a twenty-year history of reliance
and trust.

Valentines third reason regarding the potential sophistication of an insured
over a broker is also inapposite to Espenschied's facts. Espenschied had relied on

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Fleetwood 's knowledge and expertise for over twenty years. Espenschied
concentrated on trucking and it was very good at serving its customers. Its owners
and employees knew very little about insurance other than that they wanted all of
their equipment covered.

Fleetwood was more knowledgeable about the

particularities of Wilshire's policies, having served as Wilshire's exclusive
producer in the Salt Lake City and being one of Wilshire's largest Utah producer.
Viewing the facts most favorably to Espenschied leads to the conclusion that
Fleetwood was much more sophisticated and knowledgeable about the coverage
Espenschied should have.
Valentine~ fourth reason for rejecting consent judgments relates to the

fairness that it may not reflect the true damages. Here, the magnitude of damages
alleged by Herrods and the likelihood of a finding of liability on Espenschied was
high. The damages of the Herrods' economist placed the present value of just the
economic losses between $16,141,963 and $21,634,590. Non-economic damages
would be in addition to this figure. There were also personal injuries to the other
members of the Herrod family. Even a small percentage of fault such as 20%
would equate to economic losses in the range of over $3 million against
~

Espenschied. A reasonable argument could be made that the settlement, which
capped the exposure, would also benefit Fleetwood.
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Compelling policy reasons would justify shifting the risk to the agent or
broker, who typically has errors and omission liability insurance to cover its own

~

negligence. The agents or brokers liability for failure to procure insurance should
not tum on whether the customer is able to pay a settlement or judgment.
Wilshire's Arguments.

1.

Complaint fails to allege that Fleetwood is Wilshire's agent. Wilshire

argues that this Court should not consider Espenschied' s argument that Wilshire is
liable for the conduct of Fleetwood, its agent, because the complaint does not
~/

explicitly allege that Fleetwood was the agent of Wilshire. Wilshire Brief, pp. 2425. Wilshire concedes, however, that the trial court did not make any ruling in this
regard (id., p. 24); rather the trial court addressed the issue of agency on the merits.
Nonetheless, to support its argument, Wilshire cites to Big Sky Fin. Co. v. Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp., 2006 UT App. 337. In this case, however, the trial court and Utah
Court of Appeals ruled directly on the adequacy of the complaint rather than ruling
on the merits of the agency issue.
In the present case, the trial court decided to directly address the merits of
the agency issue rather than rule on the adequacy of the complaint. In fact, the
order of the trial court (which was prepared by Wilshire) never even mentions the
complaint in this regard. R. 3183-3189.

8
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Under U.R.Civ.P. 15(b)(l), if the matter which is not raised in the pleadings
is tried, it is considered part of the pleadings.
When an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by the parties' express or
implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the
pleadings. A party may move-at any time, even after judgment-to amend
the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded
issue. But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue.

Id.
Based on the extensive discovery regarding whether Fleetwood was
Wilshire's agent, the agency issue was extensively briefed below by both
Espenschied and Wilshire, attaching depositions and documents to support their
respective positions.
vib

R. 1846-1847, 2607-2610, and 2838-2839. In Wilshire's

Statement of Facts section in its motion for summary judgment, Wilshire describes
the facts in detail from which it then argues that Fleetwood was not its agent. R.
1828-1832. The trial court "tried" the agency issue and made specific findings and
conclusions regarding agency without mentioning the lack of allegations in the
complaint. Under Rule 15 (b )(1 ), this matter has been tried as if the agency issue
was pied. There is no ruling from the trial court for this court to review regarding
the adequacy of the complaint.

2.

Reasonable expectations regarding Fleetwood as Wilshire's agent.

Wilshire argues that Utah has rejected the reasonable expectation doctrine. This
""

argument, however, is misplaced. Utah has rejected the doctrine of reasonable
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expectations when applied to invalidate provisions in an insurance contract. Allen
v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P .2d 798, 804 (Utah 1992).

This,

~

however, misses Espenschied's point.
Espenschied argues that it is entitled to reasonably rely on Fleetwood's
representations and the historical course of dealings with Fleetwood over a
twenty-year period. If Fleetwood is also the agent of Wilshire, the reliance is
equally binding on Wilshire.
3.

Fleetwood not acting as Wilshire's agent.

Wilshire argues that

Fleetwood is not its agent, relying on the case of Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
761 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1988). However, in finding that an insurance broker was
not an agent for an insurer, the court in Vina did not base its decision on the mere

~

fact that the broker did not have authority to bind insurance. 761 P.2d at 586. The

Vina court, instead, looked at all the facts and circumstances of the case, including
the fact that the broker had no prior dealings with the insurer who issued the policy
to the plaintiffs. Id. Here, Fleetwood had extensive dealings with Wilshire, and
according to the agency agreement, had authority to bind coverage within the
guidelines set out by Wilshire.

R. 2636. In any event, there is no Utah law

dictating that the principles of agency only apply to an agent with binding
authority. At a very minimum, there are issues of fact that preclude summary
judgment on this issue.
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~

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellant Espenschied respectfully requests
that this Com1 reverse the summary judgments in favor of both Fleetwood and
Wilshire and remand the case for trial.
DATED this 1st day of September, 2017.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Isl Karra J Porter
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellants
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L. Rich Humpherys, 1582
Humpherys Law PLLC
36 South State Street. Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, lrf 841 l l
Tel: 8012393140
Karra J. Porter

CHRlSTENSE:--.1 &JENSEN, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (80 I) 323-5000
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472
Attorneys.for Herrods

L"l THE THlRD .J U.DICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE HERROD, SCOTT HERROD.
TAYLORHERROD,MATTHEW
HERROD, ELIZABETH HERROD, NILES
HERROD AND JANET HERROD.
Plaintiffs.

STIPULATION Al\'D JOINT 110TION
TO RE~E\V JUDGMENT

vs.

ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT
CORPORATJON., a Utah Corpordtion, aka
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT, INC.

Misc. No. 090905058

Defendant.

The parties hereby stipulate and jointly move the court as follows:
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STIPULATION
I.

On or aboui June 26, 2007. Espenschied Transport Corp entered into a

settlement agreement with Catherine P. Herrod, (individually and on behalf of Scott
He1Tod, Taylor Herrod, Vf atthew Herrod and Elizabeth Herrod, minors), Niles Herrod
and Janet Herrod ('"He1TOds,,) regarding the claims that the Herrods had against
Espenschied for wrongful death and personal injuries.
As a pa11 of the settlement agreement, Espenschied agreed to pay Herrods

2.

the amount of $1,100.000 together with interest at the rate of IO% per annum from June
26, 2007, (the date of the settlement agreement) until paid. Hcrrods agreed to collect this

amount o,ving from Espenschied's liability insurer, Wilshire Insurance Company
(''Wilshire") and/or Fleetwood Services, Inc., Espenschied's insurance broker
("Fleetwood").

3.

Pursuant to the agreement, Espenschied agreed to take what measures

were necessary and to fully cooperate in pursuing these claims against Wilshire and
Fleetv.'ood. As pan of this agreement, Espenschied consented to the judgment which was
entered in the above matter executed by this cowi on March 27, 2009 and entered on
April 3, 2009 (the "Judgment").

4.

Since that time, Espenschied has been engaged in pursuing the claims

against Wilshire and Fleetvwod in the action entitled Espenschied Transport Corp. v.

Wilshire insurance Company and Fleetwood Services, Inc., Court No. 070913289, in the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, presently on appeal to the Utah
Supreme Cou11, Case No. 20160873-SC ("Espenschied Claims'').
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5.

To eliminate any issue relating to the validity of the Judgment, the parties

seek to have the Judgment herein renewed. The Statute of Limitations period of eight
years to renew a judgment has expired; however, Espenschied acknowledges that it has
waived the Statute of Limitation defense, agreed that the Statute of Limitations on the
Judgment is tolJed while the Espenschied Claims are being pursued against Wilshire and

Fleetwood, and agreed that sa·id Judgment remains enforceable and valid. Throughout the
eight year period, I have also repeatedly acknowledged Espenschied' s obligation to the
Herrods in writing, in my depositions. and in the pleadings filed in the case involving
Espenschied's Claims against Wilshire and Fleetwood. See Declaration of Bryan
Espenschied~ attached as Exhibit A hereto.
6.

The amount owing under the Judgment is justly due to the Herrods. Since

the payment of the Judgment is based on the success of the Espenschied Claims,
Espenschied has not paid any amount toward the Judgment and the full amount plus
interest remains owing.

..,,.

Espenschied acknowledges and agrees that the Judgment should be

renewed to avoid any argwnent by Wilshire or Fleet\vood that Espenschied has suffered
no damage and cannot pursue the Espenschied Claims.

3
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JOINT MOTIO:\f
Pursuant to the above stipulation, the parties jointly move the. court to execute and

enter a renewed judgment based on the same tem1s as the original Judgment. Said
proposed judgment is filed herewith and is approved by both parties.

Dated this 14th day of August. 2017.

HUM"PHERYS LAW, PLLC

Isl L. Ric.h Humpherys
L. Rich Humpherys
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, PC

Isl Karra J. Porter
Karra Portcr

J:

Attorneys for Catherine P. Herrod,
(individual~y and on beha(f of Scott Herrod,
Taylor Herrod, .l,1atthe·w Herrod and
Elizabeth Herrod, minors), Niles Herrod
and Janet Herrod (''Herrods ")

ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT CORP

to~

At
- ~ ¼« ,,- ,./2.,,£..
..
By;,r.,1,,,.
BryaryJ. , spe schied

Authoriztd Agent for Espenschied
Transport Corp.

~.•
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this 14th day of August, 2017., I hereby certify that the original and copy of the
above STIPULATION AND JOINT MOTION TO RENEW JUDGMENT was
personally delivered to Bryan J. Espenschied and that he executed and approved the same
for and on behalf of Espenschied Transport Corp.

L. Rich Humpherys
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l. Rich Humpherys, 1582
Humpherys Law PLLC
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
SaH Lake City, UT 84111
Tel: 8012393140

KaiTa J. Porter
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472
Attorneys.for Herrods

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERTKE HERROD, SCOTT HERROD,
TAYLOR HERROD, MATTHEW
HERROD, ELIZABETH HERROD, NILES
HERROD AND JANET HERROD,

Plaintiffs,

DECLARA.TION O.F BRYAN J.
ESPE.'.'lSCHIED

vs.
ESPEJ\'SCHIED TRANSPORT
CORPORATION., a Utah Corporation, aka
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT, JNC.

Misc. No. 090905058

Defendant.

1, Bryan J. Espenschied, hereby declare as follows:

I.

During all relevant times, l have been a principal and pait owner of Espenschied

Transport Corp, a Utah Corporation ("Espenschied"). This company has ceased doing business,
except for completing the resolution of the above action and related matters. Thave been and am the
authorized representative to speak and act on behalf of Espenschied in this matter.
2.

To settle the wrongful death and personal injury claims of the above mentioned

Plaintiffs (the "Herrods") against Espenschied relating to a very tragic accident involving a trailer
owned by Espenschied, Espenschied entered into a settlement agreement with the above named
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Plaintiffs on June 26, 2007. As a part of the settlement agreement, Espenschied agreed to pay
Herrods the amount of $1, l 00,000 together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from June 26,
2007, (the date of the settlement agreement) until paid. He1rnds agreed to collect this amount
owing from Espenschied's liability insurer, Wilshire Insurance. Company (""Wilshire") and/or
Fleetwood Services, Inc., Espenschied's insurance broker ("Fleetwood").
3.

Pursuant to the agreement, Espenschied agreed to take what measures were

necessary and to fully cooperate in pursuing these claims against Wilshire and Fleetwood. As part
of this agreement, Espenschied consented to the judgment which was entered in the above matter
executed by this court on March 27~ 2009 and entered on April 3, 2009 (the "Judgment").
4.

Since that time~ Espenschied has been engaged in pursuing the claims against

Wilshire and Fleetvwod in the action entitled Espenschied Transport Corp. v. Wilshire Insurance

Company and Fleer.-vood Services. Inc.~ Court No. 070913289, in the Third District Court for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, presently on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 20160873SC ("Espenschied Claims").
5.

I understand that there is a Statute of Limitations of eight years on a claim to renew

. a judgment, as found in Section 78B-2-3 l l of the Utah Code. The Statute of Limitations period of
eight years to rene\ll the Judgment has expired; however, Espenschied has waived the Statute of
Limitation and agreed that the Statute of Limitations on the Judgment is tolled while the
Espenschied Claims are being pursued. Espenschied acknowledges and agrees that said Judgment
remains enforceable and valid. Espenschied has understood, expressed and intended from the outset
of the settlement t11at the He1wds were relying on Espenschied's cooperation to have the judf.>ment
valid as long as the Espenschied Claims were pending against Wilshire and
Fleetwood. Espenschied has therefore agreed to waive or toll any statute of limitation that would
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affect the judgment's validity. Throughout the eight year period, I have also repeatedly
acknowledged Espenschied's obligation to the Herrods in writing, in my depositions, and in the
pleadings fi1ed in the case involving .Espenschied's Claims against Wilshire and Fleetwood.
6.

The amount owing under the Judgment is justly due to the Herrods. Since the

payment of the Judgment is based on the success of the Espenschied Claims against Wilshire and
Fleetwood, Espenschied has not paid any amount toward the Judgment and the full amount plus
interest remains owing.

7.

Espenschied acknowledges and agrees that the Judgment should be renewed.

I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah and applicable federal laws that the
above is true and correct to the best ofmy knowledge, understanding and belief.
th

Dated this 14 day of August, 2017

t?L~

~ n Y Esp schied

~~£/
__. - -

Authffized agent and representative of Espenschied

Transport Corp.,
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: August 15. 2017
Isl ROBERT FAUST
11 :39:38 AM
District Court Judge

L. Rich Humpherys, i 582
Humpherys Law PLLC
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, UT 8411 I
Tel: 8012393140
Karra J. Porter
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472
Attorneys for Herrods
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE HERROD, SCOTT HERROD,
TAYLOR HERROD, MATTHEW
HERROD, ELIZABETH HERROD, NILES
HERROD AND JANET HERROD,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

vs.
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT
CORPORATION., a Utah Corporation, aka

Misc. No. 090905058

ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT, INC.
Defendant.

Based upon the Joint Stipulation and Motion to Renew the Judgement and the
Declaration of the Defendant filed herein, the Court hereby grants the motion and issues
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the following judgment.
The JUDGMENT herein executed by the court on March 27, 2009 and entered in
the Registry of Judgments on the 3 rd day of April, 2009, against Espenschied Transport
Corp, in favor of Catherine Hen-od, Scott Herrod, Taylor Herrod, Matthew Herrod,
Elizabeth Herrod, Niles Hen-od and Janet Herrod shall be renewed based on the same
terms and conditions as stated in the original judgment.
Accordingly, Catherine Hen-od, Scott Herrod, Taylor Herrod, Matthew Herrod,
Elizabeth Herrod, Niles Herrod and Janet Herrod shall have JUDGMENT against
Espenschied Transport Corp, for the amount of $1,292,499.99, together with post
judgment interest from March 27, 2009, at the rate of 10% per annum, until paid.

***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date
and seal at the top of the first page***

Approved as to fonn and content:

/s/ Bryan J. Espenschied (signature on file)
Bryan J. Espenschied
Authorized Agent for Espenschied
Transport Corp
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EXHIBIT A TO CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Agreement is made this

Ji, ~day of June, 2007, between and among Catherine P.

Herrod, (individually and on behalf of Scott Herrod, Taylor Herrod, Matthew Herrod and
/

Elizabeth Herrod), Niles Herrod and Janet Herrod ("Herrods'') and Espenschied Transport

Corporation, J. Richard Stark, and Bryan J. Espenschied ("Espenschied").
WHEREAS, Herrods are the heirs of Kimball Herrod and the owners of wrongful death
and/or personal injury claims arising out of an automobile accident which occurred January 30,
2005, on Interstate 15 at or near Woods Cross, Utah, when dual tires on a 1986 Timpte trailer
(''Trailer'') owned by Espenschied came off their axle at freeway speeds, crossed the median and
hit the Herrods' vehicle, killing Kimball Herrod ("Accident,,);
WHEREAS~ prior to the Accident, Espenschied had entered into an agreement to lease
and later sell the Trailer and other equipment to DATS Trucking, Inc. ("DATS"), wherein DATS
agreed to provide Espenschied with insurance and to indemnify Espenschied for any claims
arising out of the use or maintenance of the Trailer and other equipment subject to the lease and
sale;

WHEREAS, DATS has denied any liability to Espenschied and contests Espenschied,s
claims for insurance and indemnity;
· WHEREAS, prior to the accident, Espenschied had requested of its insurance
agent/broker, Fleetwood Services, Inc. ("Fleetwood'') and Fleetwood agreed to obtain
automobile liability insurance for the Trailer and for Espenschied, s other equipment with
coverage meeting the insurance requirements of Espenschied' s customers as well as the federal

law;
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WHEREAS, Espenschied claims that Wilshire Insurance Company, or one of its
affiliated companies, ("Wilshire") issued a motor vehicle liability policy to Espenschied, to
insure the Trailer and other equipment of Espenschied;
WHEREAS, Espenschied gave notice of the Herrods' claims to its insurer, Wilshire,
whereupon, Wilshire denied any responsibility for such claims and refused to defend
Espenschied on the grounds that it provided no coverage for the Trailer;

WHEREAS, Espenschied then made claims against its agent/broker Fleetwood for
purportedly failing to secure the requested coverage for the Trailer, however, Fleetwood likewise
denied any responsibility for the claim;
WHEREAS, Espenschied has been required to incur defense costs, including attorney's
fees, court costs and related expenses, in defending Espenschied against_ the Herrods' claims and
in pursuing cross-claims against DATS (''Defense Costs");
WHEREAS, Espenschied faces uncertain but potentially serious exposure from the

Herrods' claims and desires through a settlement with the Herrods to eliminate the possible
exposure and the ongoing Defense Costs;
NOW, THEREFORE, for the terms and conditions set forth below and other good and
valuable consideration, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Herrods agree to settle all claims they may have against Espenschied for the

amount of $1>100,000, together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum which will accrue
from the date hereof until paid.
2.

Herrods agree to withhold collection on the non-insurance assets ( excluding the

claims against third parties, set forth below) of Espenschied until such time as said claims against
the third parties have been fully settled, waived, released, litigated and/or resolved (including
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appeals}. Regardless of whether there may be any recovery, Herrods shall never pursue
collection of any of the $1,100,000 owing under this agreement against Bryan J. Espenschied
and/or J. Richard Stark, and shall never pursue Espenschied Transport Corporation for any
amount owing if the effect of so doing would expose the personal assets of either Bryan J.
Espenschied or J. Richard Stark.
3.

Espenschied shall assign to Herrods all rights and claims it may have against

DATS, excluding however claims for Defense Costs, as set forth in Exhibit 1 attached hereto
("Assignment of Claims").

4.

Espenschied shall fully pursue and prosecute all claims it may have against

Wilshire, Fleetwood, DATS (to the extent assigned), and any other third party (collectively
referred to as "Third Parties"), for liability to Espenschied arising from or relating to the
Accident and/or the Herrods claims and/or efforts or the lack thereof to secure liability insurance

coverage on the Trailer and other equipment. Espenschied shall fully cooperate and assist the
attorneys in pursuing said claims against Third Parties. This duty to cooperate is a specifically
bargained for term in this agreement, the violation of which shall be considered a material breach
of the agreement. This duty to cooperate shalt include, but not be limited to, authorizing Herrods
to consult with and use the experts Espenschied has retained in defense to the Herrods lawsuit.
5.

Espenschied will retain the law firm of CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C., to

pursue Bspenschied's claims against the Third Parties, by executing the Contingency Fee
Agreement to which this Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit A.
6.

The recovery, either from a partial settlement or from full resolution of

Espenschied's claims against the Third Parties (or any of them), will be applied and distributed
as follows:
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a. to the costs oflitigation, including attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, as
described in the Contingency Fee Agreement;
b. to the Herrods until the full amount owing under this agreement has been
paid;

c. the remaining balance, if any, after the above distributions shall be paid to
Espenschied.

7.

All decisions regarding settlement (including the amount), appeal, dismissal,

waiver, release, abandonment, mediation, arbitration, witnesses, experts, and any other decisions
regarding the claims and/or litigation against the Third Parties will be determined by the Herrods
in their sole discretion, unless or until such time as the amount owing hereunder to the Herrods,

including interest, is actually paid in full. This means that the Herrods will retain control ofall
matters regarding Espenschied's claims against the Third Parties, until the amount owing
hereunder has been fully paid. Espenschied shall not have the right to object to or consent to any

settlement or resolution of these claims. In the event the Herrods elect to settle all of
Espenschied's claims for an amount less than the full amount owing hereunder, the Herrods shall
provide Espenschied with a written satisfaction of all amounts owing hereunder and shall have
no further claims against Espenschied. It is expressly agreed by the parties that the satisfaction
of the amount owing hereunder is the goal and primary purpose of this Settlement Agreement
8.

Notwithstanding the above, Espenschied's indemnity claim against DATS for its

Defense Costs shall not be subject to the teims of this agreement.
9.

This contract shall be governed by the laws of the state of Utah.

10.

The parties shall execute the necessary documents to effect the terms of any

settlement of Espenschied's claims against the Third Parties. This will include Espenschied's
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signing a full and complete release of all claims against any Third Parties, and/or anyone else
requested by the Herrods, and a dismissal of any litigation, regardless of whether or not
Espenschied receives any amount relating to these claims.
11.

Espenschied represents and warrants that it has not released or waived any of its

claims against the Third Parties and that it will not do so without the Herrods' written consent.
12.

Espenschied further represents and warrants that no one who is not a party to this

a~eement has any interest in Espenschied' s claims against the Third Parties and Espenschied
will not agree to provide anyone else with any interest in such claims without the Herrods'

written consent.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST WAIVER

13.

The parties hereby recognize that a potential conflict of interest exists in having

the law firm of CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. act as attorneys for Espenschied
when the attorneys also represent and have represented the interests of the Herrods in pursuing
their personal injury and wrongful death claims. Nevertheless, Espenschied recognizes that
recovery to Espenschied is incidental to the payment of the amount owing hereunder and that it
is in Espenschied, s best interest to have this amount fully paid. Therefore, having fully explored
with separate counsel the meaning and extent of this conflict of interest, Espenschied hereby
waives any conflict of interest, and agrees to execute the Contingency Fee Agreement with
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. This is being done without duress and without regard to

any representations on the part of the Herrods or CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. Upon

execution of this Settlement Agreement and the Contingency Fee Agreement, to which this is
made a part, the interests of Espenschied and the Herrods in pursuing the claims against the
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Third Parties for the satisfaction of the amounts owing hereunder, will be fully aligned:
Dated this

Vic,

day of June, 2007.

Catherine P. Herrod, individuaJ~y and on
behalf of Scott Herrod, Taylor Herrod,
Matthew Herrod and Elizabeth Herrod

/
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Herrod

{

ESPENSCHIBD TRANSPORT
CORPORATION

~'-L~~~~~d1-£_/~✓---Ffryafi J.· 1fspcnscl1ied, individually
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Exhibit 1 to Settlement Agreement
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Assignment of Claims
Espenschied Transport Corporation, Bryan J. Espenschied and J. Richard Stark
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Assignors") hereby sell, assign and transfer to
Catherine Herrod, individually and as parent and guardian of Scott Herrod, Taylor
Herrod, Matthew Herrod and Elizabeth Herrod, and Niles and Janet Herrod (hereafter
collectively referred to as "Herrods") any and all claims, rights and other interests
Assignors may have against DATS Trucking, Inc. as it relates to the lease and/or sale of
the trailer that was involved in the accident of January 30, 2005, wherein Kimball Herrod
was killed, including but not limited to, claims for liability insurance, indemnity,
consequential damages relating to the lack of coverage, and any other related claims.
However, this assignment does not include Assignors' claim for attorneys fees and costs
in defending the claims of the Herrods and pursuing the cross-claims against DATS
Trucking; Inc., in the matter of Catherine Herrod, et al. v. DATS Trucking, Inc., et al.,
Civil No. 060700384, in the Second Judicial District Court, in Davis County, Utah, which
specific claim Assignors reserve.
Assignors acknowledge that by and through this assignment, Herrods shall have
the right to pursue, settle, collect and recover on any of these assigned claims without the
consent or authority of the Assignors. The Assignors shall execute any additional
documents necessary to accomplish the purpose of this assignment. To the extent this
assignment of claims is invalid in any regard, Assignors agree to pursue said claims in
behalf of the Herrods, at Herrods' direction and expense.
Dated this

z,,,b

day of June, 2007.

ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT
CORPORATION

'l . <-=:-:> l
/ u·l-JUdv·-·,-·
I.:::-:::?-·~.,___
-:-/., . _
,.____ _

¼

{JI.
,., Richard Stalk, ind1 \·iduaUy
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UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM and CIVILITY
1.
Lawyers shall advance the legitimate interests of their clients, without
reflecting any ill-will that clients may have for their adversaries, even if called upon to do
so by another. Instead, lawyers shaU treat all other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses,
and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner.
2.
Lawyers shall advise their clients that civility, courtesy, and fair dealing are
expected. They are tools for effective advocacy and not signs of weakness. Clients
have no right to demand that lawyers abuse anyone or engage in any offensive or
improper conduct. ·
3.
Lawyers shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to other
counsel or the court improper motive, purpose, or conduct.
Lawyers should avoid
hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral communications with
adversaries. Neither written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the
integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an adversary unless such
matters are directly relevant under controlling substantive law.
4.
Lawyers shall never knowingly attribute to other counsel a position or
claim that counsel has not taken or seek to create such an unjustifted inference or
otherwise seek to create a record" that has not occurred.
11

5.
Lawyers shaU not lightly seek sanctions and will never seek sanctions
against or disqualification of another lawyer for any improper purpose.

6.

Lawyers shall adhere to their express promises and agreements, oral or
written, and to all commitments reasonably implied· by the circumstances or by local
custom.
7.
When committing oral understandings to writing, lawyers shall do so
accurately and completely. They shall provide other counsel a copy for review, and
never include substantive matters upon which there has been no agreement, without
explicitly advising other counsel. As drafts are exchanged, lawyers shall bring to the
attention of other counsel changes from prior drafts.
8.
When permitted or required by court rule or otheiwiset lawyers shall draft
orders that accurately and completely reflect the court's ruling. Lawyers shall promptly
prepare and submit proposed orders to other counsel and attempt to reconcile any
differences before the proposed orders and any objections are presented to the court.
9.
Lawyers shall not hold out the potential of settlement for the purpose of
foreclosing discovery, delaying trial, or obtaining other unfair advantage, and lawyers
shall timely respond to any offer of settlement or inform opposing counsel that a
response has not been authorized by the client.
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10.
Lawyers shall make good faith efforts to resolve by stipulation undisputed
relevant matters, particularly when it is obvious such matters can be proven, unless
there is a sound advocacy basis for not doing so.
11.

Lawyers shall avoid impermissible ex parle communications.

12.
Lawyers shall not send the court or its staff correspondence between
counsel, unless such correspondence is relevant to an issue currently pending before
the court and the proper evidentiary foundations are met or as such correspondence is
specifically invited by the court.
·

Lawyers shall not knowingly file or serve motions, pleadings or other
13.
papers at a time calculated to unfairly limit other counsel's opportunity to respond or to
take other unfair advantage of an opponent, or in a manner intended to take advantage
of another lawyer s unavailability.
1

14.
Lawyers shall advise their clients that they reserve the right to determine
whether to grant accommodations to other counsel in all matters not directly affecting
the merits of the cause or prejudicing the clienes rights, such as extensions of time,
continuances, adjournments, and admissions of facts. Lawyers shall agree to
reasonable requests for extension of time and waiver of procedural formalities when
doing so will not adversely affect their client's legitimate rights. Lawyers shall never
request an extension of time solely for the purpose of delay or to obtain a tactical
advantage.
15.
Lawyers shall endeavor to consult with other counsel so that depositions.
hearings, and conferences are scheduled at mutually convenient times. Lawyers shall
never request a scheduling change for tactical or unfair purpose. If a scheduling
change becomes necessary, lawyers shall notify other counsel and the court
immediately. If other counsel requires a scheduling change, lawyers shall cooperate in
making any reasonable adjustments.
16.
Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first notifying other
counsel whose identity is known, unless their client's legitimate rights could be
adversely affected.
17.
Lawyers shall not use or oppose discovery for the purpose of harassment
or to burden an opponent with increased litigation expense. Lawyers shall not object to
discovery or inappropriately assert a privilege for the purpose of withholding or delaying
the disclosure of relevant and non-prot~cted information.
18.. During depositions lawyers shall not attempt to obstruct the interrogator or
object to questions unless reasonably intended to preserve an objection or protect a
privilege for resolution by the court. "Speaking objections" designed to coach a witness
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are impermissible. During depositions or conferences, lawyers shall engage only in
conduct that would be appropriate in the presence of a judge.
19.
In responding to document requests and interrogatories, lawyers shall not
interpret them in an artificially restrictive manner so as to avoid disclosure of relevant
and non-protected documents or information, nor shall they produce documents in a
manner designed to obscure their source, create confusion, or hide the existence of
particular documents.

20.
Lawyers shall not authorize or encourage their clients or anyone under
their direction or supervision to engage in conduct proscribed by these Standards.
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